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NO. 3

GIFTS AND THE MINNESOTA

STATUTE OF USES AND TRUSTS.
THE Revised Statutes of the Territory of Minnesota, enacted March 31st, 1851, contained a number of notable changes
from the rules of common law and, in particular, set up a
scheme of real property law which differed materially from
the doctrines of common law and equity regarding future
interests, powers, and uses and trusts.' These particular provisions have, with few changes, been carried down through the
various revisions of the Minnesota statutes and are now found
in Chapters 59, 60 and 61 of the General Statutes of Minnesota
of 1913.
The Revised Statutes of 1851, like the Wisconsin Revised
Statutes of 1849 and the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1847,
were largely based upon the New York Revised Statutes of
1830, although there are a number of important points of difference from the New York Revised Statutes which are common to the revisions of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota.
Consequently, in the endeavor to reach a satisfactory understanding of the provisions of the Minnesota statutes as interpreted by the courts, it is helpful to consider briefly not only
those doctrines of the common law which are pertinent,
1. Revised Statutes of the Territory of Minnesota 1851. Chapter 43, Of
the Nature and Qualities of Estates in Real Property and the Alienation
Thereof; Chapter 44, Of Uses and Trusts; Chapter 45, Of Powers.
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but also the New 'York Revised Statutes and the decisions
thereunder, as well as the statutes and decisions of Michigan
and Wisconsin.
In the year 1825 the legislature of New York appointed a
commission to prepare and present to the legislature a general
revision of the statutes of that state. This commission, composed of Messrs. John Duer, Benjamin F. Butler, and James
C. Spencer, presented, and the legislature with a few changes
enacted, in installments during the year 1827-28, to take effect
January 1, 1830, what was for that time a most ambitious
attempt at codification of certain portions of the law. Drastic
changes were wrought in the law of real property, and as to
trusts in particular the whole fabric of the common law was
swept aside and a new scheme set up.2
The object of the commissioners in making these changes
was to simplify conveyancing.3 Yet, in reality, the scheme
established by the New York Revised Statutes not only has
been fruitful of litigation, 4 but also, as it has been construed
by the courts, has resulted in a goodly number of unfortunate
doctrines in the law of trusts. Some of the most glaring of
these have been corrected by statutory amendments in New
York, as well as in Michigan and Wisconsin, which states, like
Minnesota, have adopted the scheme of the New York Revised
Statutes of 1830; and it is submitted that the time is now ripe
for their correction in Minnesota.
It is with respect to the present deplorable state of the law
as to charitable gifts in Minnesota that the present paper is
concerned.
2. "In Part II Chapter 1, New York Revised Statutes of 1830, the
revisers undertook to re-write the whole law of future estates in land.
uses and trusts (including, according to judicial interpretation, charitable
uses), powers, perpetuities and accumulations, and to abolish the common
law rules on these subjects. In Chapter IV. Title IV, they undertdok in
like manner to re-write the law of personal property relating to future
interests, perpetuities, accumulations of income and, according to judicial
interpretation, also charitable uses, and to abolish the common law rules
on these subjects." Canfield, New York Cases and Statutes on Trusts,
Introduction, page ii.
3. See the notes of the revisers appended to the second edition of the
New York Revised Statutes of 1830 and especially the notes to Article
2 of Part II, Chapter I, Title II.
4. "This crude and reckless legislation [The New York Revised Statutes
of 1830] seems to have been as unsuccessful in practice as it deserved
to be. It has led to great litigation and there has been the utmost difference of opinion on points which ought to have been put beyond doubt."
Gray, Restraints on Alienation, (2nd edition Sec. 282.)
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CiHARITABLE TRUSTS.

A charitable trust has two marked points of difference from
a private trust: the beneficiaries are indefinite and it is not
subject to the rules prohibiting perpetuities. 5
The objects for which charitable trusts may be established
are generally said to fall into four classes, to-wit: (1) the
relief and assistance of the poor and needy; (2) the promotion of education; (3) the advancement of religion; and (4)
public purposes in general, such as the creation of parks, the
erection of public monuments, the improvement of highways.
and the like.6
If, through a change in circumstances, the charitable trust
cannot be carried out in the precise form designated by the
donor, under the doctrine of cy pres the court will direct that
the trust be administered in a manner as near the donor's particular directions as possible. Many jurisdictions in this
7
country repudiate this doctrine either in whole or in part.
There is another use of the term cy pres which has led to
much confusion, namely, the prerogative power of the English
court of chancery under the sign manual of the crown to
direct illegal charitable trusts to legal purposes and to lay out
a charitable scheme for the administration of gifts to charity
generally with no uses specified, which gifts would otherwise
be void for indefiniteness. It is undoubted that American
5. "The characteristics of a charitable use . . . were indefiniteness
and permanence: indefiniteness in that the trust was for the benefit of a
class or the public and not for a particular person; permanence in that
the rules relating to perpetuities had no relation to charity, unless the
execution of the charity was postponed."
Fowler. Charitable Uses. 100.
There is necessarily some limit to the uncertainty or indefiniteness of the
beneficiaries. "It must sufficiently appear that [the donor] desizned
to establish a charity, and the purpose must be indicated with sufficient
clearness to enable the court, by means of its settled doctrines, to carry
the design into effect."-3 Pom. Eq. Jur. Sec. 1025. Furthermore. many
of our states require a greater degree of certainty than do the English
courts. See 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. Sec. 1025 and authorities there cited.
6. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. Secs. 1020-1024. The oft quoted definition of Justice
Gray, in Jackson v. Phillips, (1867) 14 Allen 539. is as follows: "A
charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be
applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite
number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the
influence of education or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease,
suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish themselves in life,
or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise
lessening the burdens of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described as to show
that it is charitable in its nature."
7. See 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. Sec. 1027.
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courts of equity have no jurisdiction of this character, since
they have succeeded only to the judicial powers of the English
chancellor and not to his prerogative powers.8
Much of our modern law as to charitable trusts has received its impetus from the Statute 43 Elizabeth, Chap. 4
(1601) known as the Statute of Charitable Uses. This statute,
although at one time considered to be the origin of the law of
charitable trusts in England, is now understood to have been
(so far as its general provisions are concerned) merely declaratory of the rules already recognized and enforced by the
court of chancery. 9
In the great majority of jurisdictions in the United States
charitable, trusts have been upheld upon either one of two
grounds: (1) that the Statute of Elizabeth as to charitable
uses has been adopted as one of those early English statutes
which form a part of our local common law ;o (2) that the
law of charitable trusts had been developed as a part of the
general equity jurisprudence of the court of chancery long
before the enactment of the Statute of Charitable Uses, and
thus it is immaterial whether or not that statute is in force in
this country. 1
This latter view, that the validity of charitable trusts is
in no wise dependent upon the Statute of Elizabeth, is undoubtedly the correct doctrine. A doubt as to the existence of
the jurisdiction of equity over charitable uses prior to the
Statute of Charitable Uses had been expressed in a dictum of
Lord Loughborough in the case of Attorney General v. Bowyer,12 and that dictum was relied on by Chief Justice Marshall
as the basis of his opinion in Baptist Church v. Hart's Executors," holding that charitable trusts were void in Virginia,
where the Statute of Charitable Uses had been repealed.
Subsequent to this decision, the English Record Commissioners published the "Calendar of Proceedings in Chancery
8. See the excellent exposition of cy pres in both its phases in the opinion
of Gray, J., in Jackson v. Phillips, (1867) 14 Allen (Mass.) 539, 574 et seq.
9. 3 Pom. Eq. Jur. See. 1028 and cases there cited.
10. Haeffer v. Clogan, (1898) 171 Ill. 462; Preacher's Aid Society v.
Rich (1858) 45 Me. 552; Clayton v. Hallett (1902) 30 Colo. 231, 70 Pac.
429, 59 L. R. A. 407, 97 Am.St. Rep. 117.
11. Vidal v. Girard (1844) 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205. This is now the
doctrine in most states. The authorities are collected in 5 Am. & Eng.
Ency. of Law (2nd Ed.) 899, 900, and in 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 55.
12. (1798) 3 Ves. Jr. 714, 726.
13. (1819) 4 Wheat 1, 4 L. Ed. 499.

CHARITABLE GIFTS IN MINNESOTA

during the reign of Queen Elizabeth", which showed that a
large number of bills had been filed for relief relative to charitable uses long prior to the passage of the Statute of Elizabeth.1 4 Since that publication, it has been very generally held
that charitable trusts were not dependent on the Statute of
Charitable Uses. In Vidal v. Girard's Executors, ' the United
States Supreme Court, in an able opinion by Story, J., adopted
this view.
Chief Justice Marshall's ruling in Baptist Church v. Hart's
17
Executors, 6 had, in the meantime, been followed in Virginia
and Maryland;18 and West Virginia' 9 has followed the Virginia precedents. In these jurisdictions more or less complete
relief from this unfortunate state of affairs has been provided
by statute.

20

CHARITABLE

TRUSTS IN NEW YORK.

When we come to consider the law in New York after
the enactment of the Revised Statutes of 1830 and the law of
Miehigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota, after those states copied
the New York Revised Statutes,. a further question must be
considered in determining whether charitable trusts are lawful.
The New York Revised Statutes provided that "uses and
trusts except as authorized and modified in this article are
14. See Binney's argument in Vidal v. Girard's Executors, (1844) 2
How. 127, 155, 11 L. Ed. 205.
15. (1844) 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205.
16. (1819) 4 Wheat 1, 4 L. Ed. 499.
17. Gallego's Executors v. Attorney General (1832) 3 Leigh 45, 24 Am.

Dec. 650. This decision was followed in Fifield v. Van Wyck (1897) 94
Va. 557, 27 S. E. 446. 64 Am. St. Rep. 745, where the court, repudiating
the dictum contra in Prot. Epis. Ed. Soc. v. Churchmans Reps. (1885) 80
Va. 718, said that even though the doctrine of Gallego's Case may have
been erroneous, since it had been the settled law in Virginia for fifty
years, any reversal thereof must be made by the legislature.
18. Dashiell v. Attorney General (1822) 5 H. & J. 392, 9 Am. Dec. 572.
19. Wilson v. Perry, (1886) 29 W. Va. 169, 188, 1 S. E. 302.
20. Virginia in 1839 and 1841 authorized charitable trusts for literary
and educational purposes, Va. Code, 1904, Secs. 1420, 1421. See also Sec.
1398. In West Virginia in 1868, the Virginia statutes of 1839 and 1841
were adopted, and in 1885, these were amended in such a way as to
permit the courts by a liberal construction to sustain charitable gifts
generally. See Hays v. Harris, (1914) 73 W. Va. 17, 80 S. E. 827. In
Maryland, a statute enacted in 1888, (Code, 1912, Sec. 328, Art. 93) validates gifts for any charitable use, "if the devise or bequest contained
directions for forming a corporation to take the same within twelve
months of the probate of the will." See Novak v. Orphan's Home,
(1914) 123 Md. 161, 90 Atl. 997.
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abolished."'" A later section enumerated the purposes for
which express trusts might be created. This enumeration
included four classes of private trusts of land and contained
no reference either to charitable trusts or to trusts of personal
22
property.
The revised statutes also prohibited the suspension of the
power of alienation of real estate for a longer period than two
lives in being,2" and imposed a similar prohibition 2on the
'
suspension of absolute ownership of personal property.
For a considerable time after the enactment of the New
York Revised Statutes of 1830, there was a genuine doubt as
to whether these provisions totally abclished charitable trusts,
or whether it was to be considered that the legislature intended
to leave intact the great subject of charitable trusts, as they
existed prior to the enactment of the revised statutes.
Throughout the New York decisions this question has been
more or less confused with the question already discussed as
to whether charitable trusts are dependent upon the Statute
of Charitable Uses or are independent thereof. In Shotwell
Sandford, then Assistant Vice Chancellor, held
v. Mott,2
trusts were independent of the Statute of
charitable
that
(1)
Elizabeth and consequently the repeal of that Statute in New
21. 1 R. S. 727 Sec. 45.
22. 1 R. S. 727 Sec. 55.
23. 1 R. S. 723 Secs. 14, 15.
24. 1 R. S.773 Sec. 1.
25. (1844) 2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 46. "Did the revised statutes intend
to cut off gifts and devises to charitable uses for all time to come? For
if the article 'Of Uses and Trusts' applies to charitable uses, that must
have been the intention in respect of all save devises to corporations
directly for their own use. The proposition is startling, and of vast importance. And I presume everyone, on first hearing it, will declare
that it is impossible; that no legislature in the nineteenth century could
have intended such a result. I do not think that such is to be the construction of the act. That it was not the intention clearly appears by
the notes of the revisers, accompanying this article when it was submitted
to the legislature. They proposed sweeping and radical changes in the
existing law of uses and trusts, and stated their reasons and objects fully
and elaborately. But there isnot one word upon the subject of charitable
uses. They were treating wholly of private uses and trusts; of those
intricacies and refinements in the dealings of individuals with real property which had perplexed conveyancers, and filled the courts with litigation. They proposed to cut up this class of estates by the roots, and the
legislature adopted their suggestion and destroyed it most effectually.
But public trusts and charitable uses were not within the purview of the
lawgivers. The evils which they sought to remedy were not incident to
those trusts. The provisions which they enacted for preserving what
was useful and beneficial in private trusts are inapplicable to the administration of charities."
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York in 1788 was not significant,26 and (2) that the provisions
of the revised statutes had no application whatever to charitable trusts. But a few years later, the superior court of the
city of New York in the case of Ayres v. The Methodist
Church,27 adopted a different view on both these points.
Duer, J., who delivered the opinion of the court in this case,
had been one of the commissioners who drew up the Revised
Statutes of 1830.28 In full accord with this latter case is the
2 9
decision of the New York supreme court in Yates v. Yates.

The first case to raise the question before the court of
appeals of New York was Williams v. Williams."0 The case
involved the validity of a charitable trust of personal property.
Denio, J., speaking for the majority of the Court,' held (1)
following Vidal v. Girard's Executors,* that the law of charitable trusts was not dependent upon the Statute of 43 Elizabeth, (repealed in New York in 1788), but "was at an indefinite and early period in English judicial history, engrafted
upon the common law", and (2) that "charitable gifts are
excepted from the law respecting perpetuities and consequently the provisions of the Revised Statutes."
A series of subsequent decisions in New York cast doubt
upon and finally overruled both the points decided in the
lVilliams Case. Levy v. Levy, "2 involved a will in which the
testator had devised upon trust, to establish and maintain a
26. Chancellor Walworth also had held that. though the statute of
Elizabeth relative to charitable uses was never in force in the state of
New York, yet independently of that statute the court of chancery had
an original jurisdiction to enforce and compel the performance of trusts
for pious and charitable uses, when the devise or conveyance in trust
was made to a trustee capable of taking the legal estate. Dutch Church
in Garden St. v. Mott, (1838) 7 Paige Ch. 77. (the case involved a charitable trust created prior to the enactment of the revised statutes.)
27. (1849) 3 Sandf. (5 N. Y. Supr. Ct.) 351.-"As such uses are most
plainly and directly repugnant to the statutory provisions, in relation to
trusts and perpetuities, we confess our present inability to understand
or conceive why they are not now to be considered as positively forbidden.
and therefore abolished."
28. It is interesting to note that in one of the first cases involving the
revised statutes of 1830, Coster v. Lorillard (1835) 14 Wend. 265. the
three revisers were of counsel for different parties to the suit and that
no two of them agreed in their several expositions of the meaning of the
statute.
29. (1850) 9 Barb. (N. Y.) 324.
30. (1853) 8 N. Y. 524.
31. Judge Denio's opinion was concurred in by four of the other judges.
three judges dissenting.
* (1844) 2 How. 127, 11 L. Ed. 205.
32. (1865) 33 N. Y. 97.
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school of agriculture, his farm at Monticello in Virginia (formerly the residence of President Jefferson), together with
his residuary estate comprising real and personal property
situated in New York. Wright, J., in an extended opinion
laid down four propositions.
(1) By its repeal of the Statute of Charitable Uses, (together with the mortmain acts) in 1788, the New York legislature intended "to abrogate the entire system of indefinite
trusts which were [at that time] understood to be supported
by that statute alone", as was clearly indicated by the fact
that at the same time the legislature had provided ample encouragement to learning, piety, and benevolence "through the
medium of corporate bodies created by the legislative power,
their charters specifying the precise nature of the charity
33
.
intended to be sanctioned and encouraged.
(2) A gift to charitable purposes, whether of real or
personal property, offends against the provisions of the New
York Revised Statutes as to perpetuities imposing restraints
upon the suspension of the absolute power of alienation of
estates in land and the absolute ownership of personalty.34
(3) So much of this trust as involved real estate was void
under the provisions of the revised statutes to the effect that
"all express trusts of land, except those enumerated in the
statute, are abolished," the trust in question not being among
those enumerated. 5
(4) As the trust of Monticello was void under the Virginia law,8" and as the scheme of a charitable trust provided
by the will was indivisible, the trust of the New York prop37
erty must also fail.
The doctrines laid down by Wright, J., in Levy v. Levy,"8
40
39
were re-affirmed in Bascom v. Albertson, Holmes v. Mead'
33.
34.
35.

(1865) 33 N. Y. at p. 111.
(1865) 33 N. Y. at pp. 124, 128, 132.
(1865) 33 N. Y. at p. 133.

36.

Gallego's Executor v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh 450, 24 Am. Dec.

650.
37.
four
38.
39.
40.

See note 17, supra.
(1865) 33 N. Y. at p. 135. The last point was the only one of the
in which a majority of the court concurred.
(1865) 33 N. Y. 97.
(1866) 34 N. Y. 584.
(1873) 52 N. Y. 332.
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Holland v. Alcock, 4 1 and finally irfTilden v. Green,4 2 holding
invalid the great trust of several millions of dollars created by
the will of Samuel J. Tilden for the establishment of a public
library in the city of New York.
In 1893, as a result of this last decision, the legislature in
New York enacted a statute which provided that:
"No grant, bequest, or devise for religious, educational or
benevolent uses, which shall in other respects be valid under
the laws of this state, shall be deemed invalid by reason of the
indefiniteness or uncertainty of the persons designated as
the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument creating the
41
same .
In Allen v. Stevens, 44 this statute came before the court
of appeals for construction and that court, in an elaborate
opinion by Parker, C. J., held that in consequence of this
statute it was no objection to a charitable trust (1) that the
beneficiaries thereof were indefinite, or (2) that it created a
perpetuity. It is true that the statute contains no provision
expressly absolving charitable trusts from the statutory prohibition of perpetuities, but the court took this opportunity
to go back to the doctrine announced in Williams v. Williams4 5
and to re-instate in its entirety the historic charitable trust.
This was obviously a highly commendable result, even though
one may have difficulty in reconciling the conclusion here
reached with the current of previous decisions in the same
court for a considerable period of years."0
41. (1888) 108 N. Y. 312, 16 N. E. 305, 2 Am. St. Rep. 420. This case
contains an able review of the New York authorities by Rapallo, J.
42. (1891) 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880, 14 L. R. A. 33, 27 Am. St. Rep. 487.
43. Laws of N. Y. 1893 Chap. 701, Sec. 1.
44. (1899) 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568.
45. (1853) 8 N. Y. 524.
46. The court, in coming to this conclusion, reasoned as follows: "Under
the provisions of the act, a testator may name a corporation as trustee
or provide that a corporation to be founded shall act as trustee, or the
trustee named may be an individual; but if he names none of these, the
statute provides, in effect, that the trust shall not fail, but the title to the
property devised or bequeathed shall vest in the supreme court, which
shall have control over gifts, grants, bequests and devises provided for
by the act.
"If the contention be well founded that it was not the intention of the
legislature to revive the ancient law as to the administration of such
trusts by the supreme court, and to do away with the rule requiring the
formation of a corporation for such purpose, then no permanent charity
can -be administered by the supreme court, notwithstanding the title to
the trust property is by the command of the statute vested in the supreme
court when no trustee is named by the testator. It is insisted that it cannot be, because the trust term is not measured by lives. Neither is a
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This statute was amended in 1901 by giving to the court a
modified cy pres jurisdiction, viz., the right to alter the terms
of the gift in order to carry out the general intent of the testator, if the precise terms of the gift cannot be literally carried
47

out.

Much of the same development has taken place in the
states of Michigan and Wisconsin.. As already pointed out,
these states, at an early date in their several histories, copied
largely from the New York Revised Statutes of 1830, Michigan
in its revision of 1847 and Wisconsin in its revised statutes of
1849.
Two points of difference common to the revisions of Michigan and Wisconsin must be noted: the enumeration of aucorporation, which may, as a trustee, execute a permanent trust for
charity. But, it is answered, the law has created an exception to the
general rule in favor of corporations. True, and the lawmaking power
had the right to create other exceptions, or change the law altogether; and
it has changed the law as to all cases within the scope of the act, 'to
regulate gifts for charitable purposes,' so that now the supreme court
must execute such a trust, if the title to the trust property vests in it
under the statute and shall have control over the administration, if a
trustee be named by the testator. A construction of this statute allowing
the supreme court to execute a permanent charity when the title to the
real estate is vested in it, and at the same time declaring that, where such
property is devised to a trustee named, the devise is void, would be
absurd." (1899) 161 N. Y. at p. 143. 55 N. E. 568.
47. Laws N. Y., 1901, Chap. 291. The statute was again amended slightly
in 1909. In its present form it reads as follows:
"Grants and devises of real 'property for charitable purposes. 1. No
gift, grant, or devise to religious, educationai charitable or benevolent
uses, which shall in other respects be valid under the laws of this state,
shall be deemed invalid by reason of the indenniteness or uncertainty of
the persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument
creating the same. If in the instrument creating such a gift, grant, or
devise there is a trustee named to execute the same, the legal title to the
lands or property given, granted, or devised for such purposes shall
vest in such trustee. If no person be named as trustee then the title to
such lands or property shall vest in the supreme court. 2. The supreme
court shall have control over gifts, grants and devises in all cases provided for by subdivision one of this section, and whenever it shall appear
to the court that circumstances have so changed since the execution of
an instrument containing a gift, grant or devis.z to religious, educational,
charitable or benevolent uses as to render impracticable or impossible a
literal compliance with the terms of such instrument, the court may,
upon the application of the trustee or of the person or corporation having
the custody of the property, and upon such notice as the court shall
direct, make an order directing that such gift, grant or devise shall be
administered or expended in such manner as in the judgment of the
court will most effectually accomplish the general purpose of the instrument. without regard to and free from any specific restriction, limitation
or direction contained therein; provided, however, that no such order
shall be made without the consent of the donor or grantor of the property,
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thorized trusts of real property includes, in addition to the
four classes of private trusts found in the New York statute,
the following:
"For the beneficial interest of any person or persons, when
such trust is fully expressed and clearly defined upon the face
of the instrument creating it.
4 subject to the limitations as to
time prescribed in this title.' s
A second point of difference is that the provisions of Chapter IV of Part II of the New York Revised Statutes regarding
future interests, perpetuities, and accumulations of income of
personal property are wholly omitted from the Michigan and
Wisconsin statutes.
CIARITABiL.

TRUSTS IN MICIHGAN.

In Michigan the question of the validity of a charitable
trust came before the court for the first time in the case of
ilethodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark.40 In that
case, which involved a charitable trust of real estate, Cooley,
J., speaking for the court, after noting that the Michigan
statute prohibited the suspension of the absolute power of
alienation of real property for a longer period than two lives
in being and that trust estates came within this restriction,
proceeded as follows:
"If the law of charitable uses were in force in this state,
the trust might be upheld under its rule. But that law is generally referred to as the Statute of Elizabeth, commonly
called the Statute of Charitable Uses, which, with other
English statutes, was repealed in Michigan in 1810. 1 Territorial Laws 900. There is no evidence that any pre-existing
law on that subject has ever been recognized in this state.
The Revised Statutes which took effect March 1, 1847, expressly abolished uses and trusts, except as authorized and
modified therein, and no distinction is made in the statute
between charitable uses and any others.- The same requisites
are therefore essential to their validity. The New York and
Wisconsin decisions, which are made in the light of statutes
similar to our own. are directly in point here, and we refer to
if he be living. 3. The attorney-general shall represent the beneficiaries
in all such cases, and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper
proceedings in the courts." 4 Consol. Laws of New York, 1909 Sec. 113,
p. 3396.
The New York personal property law Sec. 12 contains similar provisions
as to charitable trusts of personal property.
48. Mich. R. S. 1847 Sec. 8839 (5) ; Wis. R. S.1849 Sec. 2081 (5).
49. (1879) 41 Mich. 730, 3 N. W. 207.
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them as rendering any discussion by us unnecessary. Phelps
v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69; Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97; Bascom v.
Albertson, 34 N. Y. 584; Gram v. Prussia, &c Society, 36 N.
Y. 161; Holmes v. Mead, 52 N. Y. 332; Ruth v. OberDrunner,
40 Wis. 238. And it may be well to mention, also, that our
statute, after defining cases in which express trusts may be
created, none of which would include indefinite charitable
trusts, provides for others only in the following words: 'For
the beneficial interest of any person or persons, when such
trust is fully expressed and clearly defined upon the face of
the instrument creating it.' It is for the very reason that
trusts for charitable purposes are not fully expressed and
clearly defined that the law of charitable uses has grown up
and been maintained.'
Consequently this trust of real estate was held to be void.
In Hopkins v. Crossley, 2 a charitable trust of personal
property was involved and it was urged upon the court that
since the provisions of the New York Revised Statutes regulating interests in personal property had not been adopted in
Michigan, the New York decisions holding invalid charitable trusts of personal property were not applicable in Michigan and that the language of Cooley, J., just quoted was mere
dictum, the decision in Methodist Episcopal Church v. Clark,53
being based upon the statutory prohibition of restraints on
the alienation of real estate. The court, however, held that
Justice Cooley's language, in the earlier case, to the effect that
the Statute of Elizabeth as to charitable uses had been repealed in Michigan and that "there is no evidence that any
pre-existing law on that subject has ever been recognized in
this state" was not mere dictum, but decision, and consequently that the question was settled in that case as to all
54
charitable trusts, real or personal.
51. (1879) 41 Mich. at p. 741.
52. (1903) 132 Mich. 612, 96 N. W. 499.
53. (1879) 41 Mich. 744.
54. "We are convinced that the rule laid down is not a dictum, and that
the question was settled in that case. It is urged that this holding was
wrong, and that the court of chancery, having the powers of the English
court of chancery, has a jurisdiction over charities independent of the
statute of charitable uses,-one whose origin antedated such statute. It
must be admitted that many authorities sustain this contention, but to
adopt it we must overrule authorities in this state of long standing, which
have been followed -by the profession and the courts. The conflict among
the decisions of other states indicates that the doctrine contended for may
be of questionable policy, and, if it is not, a remedy can readily be
applied. We have felt reluctant to hold invalid this charitable trust,
which seems a meritorious one, but we see no escape from that responsibility."-132 Mich. at p. 617.

CHARIT-lBLE GIFTW I.V MINNt3SOTI

The legislature of Michigan, in 1907,:r , enacted a statute
providing that charitable trusts should not be invalid by reason
of the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries thereof, nor by reason
of .the same contravening any statute or rule against perpetuities. This statute was amended in certain particulars in
1915.56
CIIARITABI.E TRUSTS

IN

VISCONSIN.

In Wisconsin, although the statutes applicable were. at
the outset, the same as those of Michigan. a somewhat different development is to be observed.
In Ruth v. Oberbrunner,17 real estate vas devised to A and
B upon trust for two unincorporated charitable organizations.
The court (or, more properly, two of the three judges thereof,
for Ryan, C. J., having been of counsel, did not sit in the
case.) after noticing the conflicting decisions in New York
and after pointing out that "the view which we have taken of
the case renders it unnecessary to consider whether the law
of charities had its origin in that Statute [of Charitable Uses]
55. Mich. Public Acts 1907. No. 122.
56. Mich. Pub. Acts 1915 No. 280. "Sec. I. No gift. grant, bequest or
devise, whether in trust or otherwise to religious, educational, charitable
or benevolent uses, or for the purpose of providing for the care or maintenance of any part of any cemetery, public or private, or anything therein
contained which shall in other respects be valid under the laws of this
state, shall be invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the
object of such trust or of the persons designated as the beneficiaries
thereunder in the instrument creating the same, nor by reason of the
same contravening any statute or rule against perpetuities. If in the
instrument creating such a gift, grant, bequest or devise, there is a trustee
named to execute the same, the legal title to the lands or property given,
granted; devised or bequeathed for such purposes, shall vest in such
trustee. If no such trustee shall be named in said instrument or if a
vacancy occurs in the trusteeship, then the trust shall vest in the court of
chancery for the proper county, and shall be executed by some trustee
appointed for that purpose by or under the direction of the court; and
said court may make such orders or decrees as may be necessary to vest
the title to said lands or property in the trustee so appointed? Sec. 2.
The court of chancery for the proper county shall have jurisdiction and
control over the gifts, grants, bequests and devises in all cases provided
for by section one of this act. Every such trust shall be literally construed by such court so that the intentions of the creator thereof shall
be carried out whenever possible. The prosecuting attorney of the county
in which the court of chancery shall have jurisdiction and control shall
represent the beneficiaries in all cases where the, are uncertain or indefinite, and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings
in the court, but he shall not be required to perform any duties in connection with such trusts in any court outside of this State."
This statute is not retroactive. but applies only to trusts created after
its enactment. Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, (1910) 162 Mich. 457, 127 N.
W. 673.
57. (1876) 40 Wis. 238.
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or, not," following the later New York cases, held that the
statutory declaration to the effect that "uses and trusts, except
as authorized and modified in this chapter, are abolished"
necessarily includes charitable trusts:
"The statute was evidently an attempt on the part of the
legislature to revise and codify the -law of uses and trusts;
including, it would seem, within clearly prescribed regulations,
charitable uses as well as other trusts, in order that a complete system might exist, 'adapted to the condition of our
people and the nature of our institutions'. We must therefore hold that all trusts, except those specifically saved by
subsequent provisions of Chapter 84, are abolished by the
first section."
Shortly after this decision, the legislature amended the
statute restricting the suspension of the absolute power of
alienation and that section of the Statute of Uses and Trusts
which contains the enumeration of authorized trusts, by
excluding from the operation of the former and including
within the latter "real estate given, granted, or devised to
literary or charitable corporations which shall have been
organized under the laws of this state for their sole use and
and benefit." 58
In 1879, by which time the court had been increased to five
judges, in Dodge v. Williants,5 9 Ryan, C. J., speaking for a unanimous court, upheld as valid a charitable trust of property
which by the doctrine of equitable conversion was held to be
personal property.
"Strenuous objections to the charitable bequests in the
will before the court, were founded on the statutes prohibiting
perpetuities, and regulating uses and trusts. Chaps. 83 and
84 R. S. 1858. It is almost sufficient to say, for the purposes of this case, that both of these statutes are expressly
limited to realty.
"The English doctrine of perpetuities applied to estates
both real and personal, and grew up by a series of judicial
decisions. Perry on Trusts, Secs. 377, 379. It appears to
have been applied to private trusts, but not to trusts for charitable uses, which usually are essentially and indefinitely permanent. Perry, Secs. 384, 687, 736: 'The rule of public policy
which forbids estates to be indefinitely inalienable in the
hands of individuals, does not apply to charities. These, being
established for objects of public, general and lasting benefit,
58. Wis. Rev. St. 1878 Secs. 2039, 2081, (5).
59.

(1879) 46 Wis. 70, 1 N. W. 92.
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are allowed by the law to be as permanent as any human institution can be, and courts will readily infer an intention in
the donor that they should be perpetual.'
"But were this otherwise, the statute limiting the rule
against perpetuities to realty, manifestly abrogates the English
doctrine as applicable to personalty. Expressio unius exclusio
alterius.
"It is proper to say in this connection that a statute of
New York, 1 Revised Statutes, 773, applies the doctrine of
perpetuities to personal estate, without exception in favor of
charitable uses. This renders New York cases
" 60 on this point
inapplicable here. Levy v. Levy, 33 N. Y. 97.
In Beurhaus v. Cole,6 1 the court held void a devise of realty
to the city of Watertown upon a charitable trust, on the ground
that the power of alienation was perpetually suspended and
that this devise was not within the exception provided in the
revision of 1878.62
Harrington v. Pier6' involved a bequest to trustees of what
by the rule of equitable conversion was personal property "to
be by them or the survivor of them expended for temperance
work in the city of Milwaukee

.

.

.

within five years from

the time the same shall come to the hands of the trustees".
Marshall, J., speaking for the court, carefully reviewed the
authorities and pointed 'out that the doctrines announced by
Ruth v. Oberbrunner64 and Dodge v. WVilliams,6 5 though not
necessarily the judgments therein, were so mutually inconsistent that "if one theory was right, the other was necessarily wrong". 66 Dodge v. Williams was triumphantly upheld.
and the following propositions, among others, laid down:
(1) The common law system of trusts for charitable uses
60. (1879) 46 Wis. at pp. 95, 96. 97.
61. (1897) 94 Wis. 617, 631, 69 N. W. 986.
62. See note 58, supra. The court said: "It is clear that the city is not
a literary or charitable corporation organized for 'their sole use and
benefit;' hence, althous the trusts are charitable in their nature, they
do not come within the exceptions laid down in sec. 2039, and hence the
absolute power of alienation cannot be suspended longer than two lives
in being and twenty-one years thereafter. The evident intention of the
will is that the twenty acres shall be perpetually used for the home for
aged and poor people, and that the race track shall be perpetually used
as a driving park and agricultural grounds. This plainly constitutes a
future estate in each parcel with the power of alienation perpetually suspended, which, under Sec. 2038, is void in its creation."
63. (1900) 105 Wis. 485, 82 N. W. 345.
64. (1876) 40 Wis. 238.
65. (1879) 46 Wis. 70.
66. (1900) 105 Wis. at 502.
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did not originate with, nor is it dependent upon, the Statute
of Charitable Uses.
(2) The Wisconsin statutes of perpetuities and of uses
and trusts do not apply to bequests for charitable uses.
Whether they do to devises to such uses is not here decided.
(3) The New York doctrine as to the effect of its statutes
of perpetuities and uses and trusts upon trusts for charitable
uses, does not prevail in Wisconsin as to personal property.
7
Whether it does as to real estate is not here decided.
In Danforth v. Oshkosh,68 certain real estate situated in
the city of Oshkosh was devised to trustees upon trust, to be
by them conveyed to the city for a public library site within
three years, if by that time a certain sum should be donated
by others for the erection, equipment, and maintenance of
such library. Dodge, J., speaking for the majority of the
court, adopted as final the rule laid down in Ruth v. Oberbrunner69 and Beurhaus v. Cole, 7 0 saying:

"Our conclusion on this subject is both that the statutes,
as an original question of construction, prohibit suspension
of the power of alienation for the forbidden period, whether
the grant be for charitable or other purposes, save for the express exceptions; also that all the prior decisions of this court
are in support of such a construction, and the question is not
an open one in this state. If the policy is unwise, it can be
further modified for the future by the legislature, without
sacrifice of rights acquired upon faith of the present statutes
and the construction given thereto by this court during at
least twenty-five years."
The court, however, upheld the gift as an absolute one to
the city, which must vest within three years, a lawful provision. 7x
Marshall and Siebecker, JJ., while concurring in the judgpient, delivered separate opinions to the effect that the statutes
prohibiting perpetuities and regulating uses and trusts did not,
67. The above propositions are from the syllabus prepared by Marshall,
J. Cassoday, J. dissented, mainly on the ground that the terms of the
trust in question were too indefinite, relying upon Morice v. Bishop of
Durham. (1804) 9 Ves. 399.
68. (1903) 119 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258.
69. (1876) 40 Wis. 238.
70. (1887) 94 Wis. 617, 69 N. W. 986.
71. The statute had been amended in 1887 to allow a suspension of the
power of alienation for two lives in being plus twenty-one years. See
Kopmeier's Will, (1902) 113 Wis. 233, 89 N. W. 134.
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in their opinion, apply to trusts for charitable uses. The concluding paragraph of Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion
embodied a prayer for legislative intervention in support of
charitable trusts.

72

This prayer was promptly granted, for in 1905 the legislature amended the statute regulating restraints on the alienation of real property by excepting therefrom real estate given
or devised "to a charitable use.

'
73

In Will of Cavanaugh,74 a testamentary gift, upon -a trust
for masses, of a residuary estate comprising real and personal
property, was upheld, the court holding it to be a trust of personalty under the doctrine of equitable conversion and overruling an earlier decision 2 which had held that a bequest for
masses was void.
Here the court returned to its earlier view that charities
are not within the Statute of Uses and Trusts.
"It seems clear that the testator intended an equitable
conversion. The main question in the case before us, therefore, is whether a bequest for masses is a charitable bequest,
and, this being determined in the affirmative, we easily reach
the conclusion that the will is valid. In Dodge v. Williams
and Harrington v. Pier, it is determined, after an exhaustive
72. "It is now, seemingly, up to the legislature, as it was in New York
in 1893, to say whether a broad policy as to devises of property to charity
shall prevail in this state, or not. It will, in the light of the decision in
this case, be unmistakable that if the public desire is that men of wealth
shall at least be permitted to have a free hand in devoting their property
to the benefit of mankind instead of to mere selfish or private ends, legislative aid or command must be had in the matter. Why should such
free hand not be permitted? That is the policy which generally prevails
in every section of our country. Why should Wisconsin be an exception? The legislature must answer that. The responsibility for the
continuance of the exception rests with that branch of the government,
regardless of whether it is responsible for having created it or not. If
what I have written shall so emphasize that situation as to stimulate
remedial action, placing our state in the front rank of communities as
regards favoring devises of privately accumulated wealth to charitable
objects, it will be a 'consummation devoutly to be wished'." 119 Wis. at
p. 310.
73. Laws of 1905, Ch. 511. The statute as thus amended reads as follows: "The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any
limitation or condition whatever for a longer period than during the
continuance of two lives in being at the creation of the estate and twentyone years thereafter, except in the single case mentioned in the next
section, and except when real estate is given, granted or devised to a
charitable use or to literary or charitable corporations which shall have
been organized under the laws of this state, for their sole use and benefit,
or to any cemetery corporation, society or association."
74. (1910) 143 Wis. 90, 126 N. W. 672.
75. McHugh v. McCole, (1897) 97 Wis. 166, 176, 72 N. W. 631.
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review of the authorities,, that chancery had jurisdiction over
public trusts or charities in England before the Statute of 43
Elizabeth, c.4, and such chancery jurisdiction became a part of
our jurisprudence, and, therefore, charitable trusts may be
enforced and are not controlled by our Statute of Uses and
Trusts. In the nature of things, this was held necessary, because a public trust or charitable use is necessarily indefinite
and uncertain, especially as to beneficiaries; that a public trust
begins where a private trust ends as regards certainty and
definiteness. Of course some degree of certainty must obtain
even in a public trust. The scheme of charity must be sufficiently indicated, or a method provided whereby it may be
ascertained and its objects made sufficiently certain to enable
the court 7 to enforce an execution of the trust according to the
scheme.

Again in Maxey v. Oshkosh,7 7 a charitable trust of personal
property was once more upheld, this time by a unanimous
court. Marshall, J., in a separate opinion of concurrence, rejoices that "the spectre of the New York heresy" which "was
buried out of sight in that state in Allen v. Stevens"78 has
finally been banished from Wisconsin.
CHARITABLE TRUSTS IN

MINNESOTA.

In Minnesota the history of charitable trusts proper is
simple enough, though far from being satisfactory. The history of the judicial inventions to which the supreme court of
the state has had to resort in order to sustain many worthy
gifts for charitable objects is more or less tortuous and will
only be briefly summarized in this paper.
The Minnesota Territorial Revised Statutes of 1851, like
those of Michigan and Wisconsin, copied the provisions of the
New York Revised Statutes as to restraints on alienation of
real estate, but did not adopt the provisions as to restraints
76. (1910) 143 Wis. at pp. 101, 102.
77. (1910) 144 Wis. 238, 128 N. W. 899. It is difficult to find much dif-

ference between the terms of the gift in this case and the terms of the
gift in Danforth v. Oshkosh, (1903) 119 Wis. 262, 97 N. W. 258, supra,
but the court here found that "there are many provisions in the will under
consideration which indicate an intention on the part of the testatrix
to create a public charitable trust." Marshall, J., in his concurring opinion,
suggests that the changed situation wrought by the legislative declaration
(i. e. the amendment of 1905, exempting from the statute of perpetuities
real estate granted or devised to a charitable use) may perhaps justify the
court in now declaring to be a charitable trust what prior to-the amendment must have been upheld as an outright gift to the city in order to save
it from destruction.
78. (1899) 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568.
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upon the absolute ownership of personalty. The Statute of
Uses and Trusts was for many years like that of New York."
But in 1875 and again in 1893 additional subdivisions were
added to the list of authorized trusts, covering trusts of personal property. 0
The first case involving the validity of a charitable trust
seems to be Little v. JVillford.1 In this case the plaintiff had
deeded land to certain individuals as trustees of the Mlethodist Episcopal Church- of Olmsted County, (which church
was not incorporated) "in trust to be used, maintained, kept,
and disposed of as a place of divine worship, for the use of
the ministry and membership of the Methodist Episcopal
Church in the United States". The court held that this was
a charitable trust and, in consequence, void.
"Such trusts are not recognized in the statute, and it is
expressly declared, in the first section of the chapter upon
uses and trusts, that, except as thereby authorized, they are
abolished. The subject has undergone elaborate discussion in
New York under an act substantially like our own, and it may
be regarded as settled in that state, as well as in other states
which have adopted similar statutory provisions, that such
uses are abolished by our statute. Willard, Eq. Jur. (Potter's
Ed.) 569; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. Sec. 1029; Holmes
v. Mead, 52 N. Y.
'
332; Meth. Church v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730. 82
The opinion continues:
"The legislative policy of this state is not only indicated by
the terms of this statute, but by the provisions that are made
for the incorporation of religious and other societies under the
general law, and for the direct ownership and control of property granted to them, or for their benefit. Pub. St. 1858, c. 17,
Secs. 20, 21, 39; Gen. St. 1878, c. 34, Sec. 214, etc. The purpose is sufficiently manifest, (as respects real estate, certainly,)
to discourage the accumulation of property in the hands of
trustees, subject to an uncertain disposition, and to place it
under the direct control of those entitled to the beneficial
interest in it, except in the particular cases expressly declared
in the statute. The sections of the statute last above referred
to recognize inchoate and equitable rights in such associations
to property acquired by or intended to be granted to them, the
79. The fifth class of authorized trusts added to the Michigan and Wis-

consin statutes-see note 48 supra-was inserted in the Minnesota revision of 1851, (Ch. 44, Sec. 11 (5), but was dropped from the General
Statutes of 1866.
80. Laws 1875, Ch. 53, Laws 1893 Ch. 84.
81. (1883) 31 Minn. 173, 17 N. W. 282.
82. (1883) 31 Minn. at p. 176.
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control of which, upon their becoming incorporated, passes to
the corporate body."
The doctrine announced by this case has been followed
without question ever since. In Lane v. Eaton83 a devise of
realty to trustees for the benefit of the Salvation Army (an
unincorporated religious society) was held invalid as a gift in
trust. (Happily, the gift was upheld on another ground, of
which more will be said later.) Said the court:
"Section 4274, c. 43, G. S. 1894, provides that uses and
trusts are abolished, except as authorized by that chapter. It
is well settled in the states from which we derived this statute
that it has abolished the great body of the English law of charitable uses and trusts and the doctrine of cy pres as administered in England. See 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. Secs. 1018-1029.
Under this statute the beneficiary of the trust must be certain,
or capable of being rendered certain. Therefore no unincorporated, voluntary association, whose membership is fluctuating and uncertain, can be the cestui que trust. Downing v.
Marshall, 23 N. Y. 366; Methodist Church v. Clark, 41 Mich.
730, 3 N. W. 207; Ruth v. Oberbrunner, 40 Wis. 238. See,
also, 2"Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. Sec. 1029, and cases cited in Holland
E. 305. See, also, German v.
v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312, 16 'N.
' 4
Scholler, 10 Minn. 260 (331).

8

This doctrine was re-affirmed in Shanahan v. Kelly :85
"That all trusts, including charitable trusts in real estate,
except as authorized by chapter 43, are abolished, and that the
beneficiary of any authorized trust must be certain, or capable of being rendered certain, or the trust is void, is the settled
law of this state."
It was held at an early date that the Statute of Uses and
Trusts as originally enacted in Minnesota did not apply to
trusts of personal property, or at least that the section abolishing certain resulting trusts was applicable only to resulting
trusts of realty. 6 But in Shanahan v. Kelly,87 it was held
that the amendments of 1875 and 1893, adding to the list of
authorized trusts certain trusts of personalty, brought all
83. (1897) 69 Minn. 141, 71 N. W. 1031.
84. (1897) 69 Minn. at p. 143.
85. (1903) 88 Minn. 202. 210, 92 N. W. 948. See to the same effect,
Watkins v. Bigelow, (1904) 93 Minn. 210, 221, 100 N. W. 1104; Young
Men's Christian Association v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 139 N. W.
806.
86. Baker v. Terrell, (1863) 8 Minn. 195 (165). But see Y. M. C. A. v.
Horn. 120 Minn. 404, 139 N. W. 806, discussed infra.
87. (1903) 88 Minn. 202, 211, 92 N. W. 948.
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trusts of personal property, as well as trusts of real property,
within the statute.88
"It is obvious from the mere reading of [the statute] as it
now stands that, whatever may have been the rule prior to
1875, all express trusts, including charitable trusts, in personal
property, except as provided therein, are abolished, precisely
as are trusts in real estate. There is no reasonable rule of
construction which will exclude personal property from the
trusts prohibited by the statute, and we so hold."
In the meantime, one more subdivision had been added to
the enumeration of authorized trusts:
"Sixth.

Any incorporated city or village in the state of

Minnesota now or hereafter organized is authorized to receive

by gift, grant, devise or bequest and take charge of any
money, stocks. bonds, personal, real or mixed estates, choses
in action and property of any kind whatever, and to invest,
re-invest and loan the same for the benefit of any public
library association in such city or village and any public cemetery association located within ten miles of the corporate
limits of any such city or village free from taxation, and administer the same in accordance with the will of the testator or
the grant of the grantor of the estate. The district court of
the state of Minnesota shall have the power in respect to
such trust, estate and trustees as are conferred on the said
court by this chapter in respect to other trusts."8 9

88. The amendments were as follows:
(5) "To receive and take charge of any money, stocks, bonds, or
valuable chattels of any kind, and to invest and loan the same for ,the
benefit of the beneficiaries of such express trust; and the district courts
of the state shall, on petition and hearing, have power to appoint a
trustee for the purpose herein set forth, requiring such trustee to give
such bond for the faithful execution of such express trust as to the
court may seem right and proper; and express trusts, created under the
provisions of this clause, shall be administered under the direction of
the court." Laws 1875 Ch. 53,-now G. S.1913 Sec. 6710 (5).
(7) "For the beneficial interests of any person or persons, when
such trust is fully expressed and clearly defined upon the face of the
instrument creating it; providing such trust shall not endure for a period
longer than the life or lives of specified persons in being at the time of
its creation, and for twenty-one years after the death of the survivo of
such persons; provided, further, that any and all trusts which do not
permit the free alienation of the legal estate by the trustee so that when
so alienated it shall be discharged from all trusts, shall be deemed and
construed, as heretofore, and shall not be authorized by the provisions of
this subdivision." (Laws 1893 Ch. 84. as amended by Laws 1901 Ch. 95now. with slight amendments. G. S.1913 Sec. 6710 (6). A rovision much
like this subdivision is found in the Michigan and Wisconsin statutes, but,
it seems, has not been construed to apply to personal property. See the
Michigan and Wisconsin cases already discussed. The 1905 Minnesota
Revision removes all doubt by inserting after the first clause the words:
"whether such trust embraces real or personal property or both."
89. Laws 1893, Ch. 84. This was amended in 1901 by adding the words,
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Referring to this subdivision, the court, in Shanahan v.
Kelly,"° said:
"All trusts, with the possible exception of those authorized
by the sixth subdivision of section 11, whether in real or
personal estate, authorized by chapter 43, in order to be valid,
must be definite and certain as to the beneficiaries of the
trusts, or capable of being rendered certain. This is no longer
an open question in this state."
In City of Owatonna v. Rosebrock,91 a bequest of five
thousand dollars to the city of Owatonna, as an endowment
in perpetuity for a kindergarten, was upheld under the section
last above quoted, the court holding further that "the proviso
attached to [subdivision 4 of the same section] in reference
to perpetuities has no application to bequests of this character
92
to a municipality, they being expressly authorized".
Within a few months of the decision in Shanahan v.
Kelly,93 the legislature enacted a statute authorizing charita"or for the purpose of establishing or maintaining a kindergarten or other
school or institution of learning therein." in order to uphold the trust
referred to in Owatonna v. Rosebrock. (1903) 88 Minn. 318, 322, 92 N. W.
1122. This subdivision is now G. S. 1913, Sec. 6710 (7).
90. (1903) 88 Minn. 202, 212, 92 N. W. 948.
91. (1903) 88 Minn. 318, 92 N. W. 1122.
92. (1903) 88 Minn. at p. 324. This subdivision as to municipal charitable trusts was again amended by Laws 1915, Ch. 98, as follows:
"Provided, however, that each city in the State of Minnesota which
now has or hereafter may haue 20,000 and not more than 50,000 inhabitants, in addition to the foregoing, may receive by gift, grant, devise,
or bequest, and take charge of, convert, invest and administer, free from
taxation, real or personal property, or both, of any kind or nature whatsoever, and wherever located, for any public or charitable purpose, or to
provide, enlarge, improve, lease and maintain for the use and benefit of the
inhabitants of such city, animal, bird, fish, game and hunting preserves,
public parks, public grounds, public waterways, public bath houses and
grounds used in connection therewith and public play grounds within
or without the limits of such city, whether within or without this state,
or for the support, medical treatment and nursing of the worthy poor
residing in such city."
A further act by the same legislature also affects municipal charitable
trusts.-Laws 1915, Ch. 183:
"Any city in the state of Minnesota now or hereafter having a
population of over fifty thousand inhabitants, shall, in addition to all
other powers now possessed by it, have, and it is hereby given, power
and authority to accept in trust, gifts, devises and bequests of money
or property, whether the same be donated, devised or bequeathed prior
or subsequent to the passage of this act, for the purpose of founding,
establishing and maintaining free medical dispensaries for the benefit
,bf the poor of any such city or of the county in which any such city
is situated, and for the purpose of founding, establishing and maintaining
free public libraries for the use and benefit of any of the inhabitants of any
such city or of the county in which any such city is situated."
93. (1903) 88 Minn. 202, 92 N. W. 948.
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ble trusts, modelled apparently on the New York statute of
1893 as amended in 1901,1 4 though much more loosely drawn.

The statute was entitled an act to amend the sixth subdivision
[what is now the seventh subdivision] of that section of the
state of uses and trusts which enumerates authorized trusts.9 5
The restrictive form of the title of this statute led to its undoing, for in Watkins v. Bigelow,96 the enactment was held to
be unconstitutional, on the ground that its subject matter was
not expressed in the title:
"No legislator, lawyer, or layman, by reading the title,
would understand, or even stispect, that the purpose of the
act was to effect a practical repeal of the existing statute prohibiting express trusts by authorizing the creation of trusts
for nearly every conceivable purpose; to change the settled
public policy of the state on the subject of trusts, as indicated
by its statutes and the decisions of its courts for fifty years;
to open wide the door for the abuses which the original statute
was intended to remedy; to permit an evasion of our law
against perpetuities and accumulations by the creation of
trusts; to abrogate the rule requiring the beneficiaries to be
certain, or capable of being rendered certain; and to establish
the ancient and discarded rule of charitable uses, and to invest
the courts with the prerogative power of cy pres in its most
obnoxious form. Such is the legal effect of the statute in
question.
"Such radical changes in our laws and public policy were
concealed under a title declaring that the purpose of the act
was to amend a particular subdivision of a section of the
statute authorizing the creation of a particular class of trusts.'
The title relates to a particular class of trusts, while the act
itself relates to general legislation on the subject of trustsa clear departure from the title. We (hold that the title of
chapter 132, p. 188, Laws 1903, is restrictive, and that the
subject matter of the act is not expressed
in its title, and there' '9 7
fore the whole act is unconstitutional.

94. See note 47, supra.
95. Now G. S. 1913, Sec. 6710.
96.

(1904) 93 Minn. 210, 100 N. W. 1104.
97. (1904) 93 Minn. at pp. 223, 224. Contrast with this vigorous disapproval of "the ancient and discarded rule of charitable uses," the opinion
of Parker, C. J., in Allen v. Stevens, (1899) 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. E. 568,
and the views several times expressed by Marshall, J., in the late Wisconsin decisions above quoted, especially note 72 supra.
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Thus in Minnesota today there are many difficulties attendant upon the creation of charitable gifts. The present status
of the law may be briefly summarized as follows:
I. A gift, inter vivos or by will, of realty or personalty
may be made to a municipal corporation in trust for one of
the charitable purposes enumerated in subdivision seven of
section 6710 General Statutes 1913, together with the amendment thereof by Laws 1915, chapter 98. The provisions of
Laws 1915, chapter 183, also fall within this class of what
might be called municipal trusts.* Such trusts (certainly
those in subdivision seven), if of.personal property, may last
in perpetuity. 9

Whether the same would be true if the. trust res were real
property and whether the free alienation of the legal estate by
such trustee might be suspended for a period exceeding two
lives in being 9 are questions which seem not yet to have been
decided.
II. A gift of property, real or personal, inter vivos or by
will, may be made outright to an existing corporation which
is authorized by its charter to receive and hold such property,
the property given to be employed for some purpose for which
such corporation is organized. 00 The authorities disclose a
commendable tendency to hold as such an outright gift what
would under ordinary circumstances be more properly con-

strued as a gift to the corporation in question for a charitable
* See Note 92, supra.
98. City of Owatonna v. Rosebrock. (1903) 88 Minn. 318, 324, 92 N. W.
1122. See, also, Young Men's Christian Ass'n. v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn.
404, 413, 139 N. W. 806.
99. See G. S. 1913 Secs. 6664, 6665, 6710.
100. Atwater v. Russell, (1892) 49 Minn. 57, 82, 51 N. W. 629, 52 N. W.
261; Lane v. Eaton, (1897) 69 Minn. 141, 146, 71 N. W. 1031; Watkins v.
Bigelow, (1904) 93 Minn. 210, 224, 100 N. W. 1104; Young Men's Christian Ass'n. v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 415, 139 N. W. y06. In the
case last cited, P. E. Brown, J., speaking for the court, said (p. 415):
"It must be conceded, as contended by the respondent, that it is the
settled law of this state that a gift to a private individual, in trust for
either personal or charitable purposes, must designate the beneficiaries at
least in such a way that they are capable of being rendered certain, but
that a gift to a corporation, with directions as to use. may be valid, not as
a trust, but as a gift upon condition, though the ultimate beneficiaries of
the gift are more or less uncertain."
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use.""1 This same tendency was noticeable in New York and
Wisconsin before the statutes of those states reinstated the
doctrine of charitable trusts. 0 2
It is not entirely clear what would happen if the corporation were to use the property so given for one of its authorized
purposes, but not the purpose designated by the donor, but it
seems probable that the courts would recognize a right of
10 3
reverter to the donor or his representatives.
III. A gift of property, real or personal, seemingly either
inter vivos or by will, may be made to trustees, to be by them
transferred to a corporation thereafter to be organized for
the purpose of carrying out the objects stipulated by the
donor or testator, provided that (1) such corporation be
formed within a reasonable time thereafter, or perhaps within
"the life or lives of specified persons in being at the time of
(the trust's) creation and for twenty-one years after the sur101.

See the cases cited in the preceding note.
In Cone v. Wold, (1902) 85 Minn. 302. 88 N. W. 977, it is stated
that "a donor has a right to impose upon a gift a condition which will
bind the donee to use the funds in the nature of a trust."
102. Bird v. Merklee, (1895) 144 N. Y. 544, 39 N. E. 645. 27 L. R. A. 423;
Danforth v. Oshkosh. ,(1903) 119 Wis. 262. 97 N. W. 258. See also Woman's Foreign Missionary Society v. Mitchell (1901) 93 Md. 199, 48 Atl.
737, 53 L. R. A. 711.
103. Reference is made in Atwater v. Russell (see note 100, supra) to the
provision that charitable corporations "are prohibited from diverting
such gift from the specific purpozes desizinated by the donor." (See G.
S.1913 Sec. 6527.) Shanahan v. Kelly, (1903) 88 Minn. 202, 92 N. W. 948.
suggests by way of dictum that if a corporation were "expressly organized
and authorized by law to do the work for which the bequests were made,
it could be dissolved should it abuse its franchise." This statement is
quoted with approval in Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Horn, (1913)
120 Minn. 404,416, 139 N. W. 806.
In the statute authorizing the formation of a corporation "for the
purpose of administering and furnishing relief and charit- for the wi)-t 1 •
poor who may reside in a designated locality," (G. S. 1913 Secs. 6534 et
seq., L. 1895 Ch. 158) and also in the case of corporations formed for
maintaining homes for dependent children (G. S. 1913 Sec. 6;49 et seq..
L. 1913 Ch. 314.) or for aged men and women (G. S.1913 Sec. 6552 et seql..
L. 1911 Ch. 65) it is expressly provided that any court of equity, on its
own motion or on application, may have and exercise visitorial powers
over its officers and affairs (G. S. 1913 Secs. 6535, 6550, 6555). But.
obviously, there are many charitable corporations not within these statutes
last quoted.
In Cone v. Wold. (1902) 85 Minn. 302. 88 N. W. 977, the court imposed a resulting trust on the funds contributed by the city of Minneapolis to the Minneapolis Police Department Relief Association when the
association was dissolved and could not, therefore, carry out the conditions annexed to the gift. "The acceptance of the money from the city impressed with the condition amounted to a contract on the part of the association that it would use the money for the particular purposes specified in
its constitution and by-laws as then existing, and upon its refusal to proceed
further the money should be returned to the city as a resulting trust. The
purposes for which it was created have ceased, and the trust has failed."
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vivor of them",'10 4 and (2) if the subject matter of the gift be
real estate, the trustees must be given a power of sale thereof;
otherwise there is a suspension of the power of alienation
two lives in being, as is required by
which is not limited by
105
the Minnesota statute.
IV. A gift, either, it seems, inter vivos or by will, of personal property or of real property directed to be sold (which
by the doctrine of equitable conversion is treated as personal
property,) 1 6 if of the character described in subdivision five,
-- "to receive and take charge of any money, stocks, bonds or
valuable chattels of any kind and to invest and loan the same
10 7
for the benefit of the beneficiaries of such express trust"'
may be made to a trustee upon a perpetual trust, for a definite
beneficiary, and such beneficiary may be a charitable corporathe profits of the trust upon a condition as to
tion, receiving
08
its use.'
The unusual feature of the case cited in support of this last
proposition is that a private trust of personalty in perpetuity
is held to be lawful. 0 9 This seems to the writer to be an un104. In Young Men's Christian Ass'n. v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, at
417, 139 N. W. 806, the court uses the phrase "[a corporation] to be
thereafter organized within the time limited by law."
105. G. S. 1913 Secs. 6710, 6664, 6665. See Atwater v. Russell, (1892)
49 Minn. 22, 56, 51 N. W. 629, 52 N. W. 261. In re Tower's Estate (1892)
49 Minn. 371. 52 N. W. 27. Y. M. C. A. v. Horp (1913) 120 Minn. 404,
417, 139 N. W. 806.
106. See In re Tower's Estate, (1892) 49 Minn. 371, 52 N. W. 27; Y. M.
C. A. v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 421, 139 N. W. 806.
107. G. S. 1913, Sec. 6710 (5). "To receive and take charge of any

money, stocks, bonds, or valuable chattels of any kind and to invest and
loan the same for the benefit of the beneficiaries of such express trust;
and the district courts of the state shall, upon petition and hearing have
power to appoint a trustee for the purpose herein set forth, requiring
such trustee to give such bond for the faithful execution of such express
trust as to the court may seem right and proper; and express trusts
created under the provisions of this paragraph shall be administered under
the direction of the court."
108. Y. M. C. A. v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 139 N. W. 806. Here
again we may observe a tendency, already noted in another connection,
(note 100 supra,) to hold such a disposition as a gift of the beneficial
interest to the corporation, with a direction or condition as to its use,
rather than a gift to such corporation upon a charitable trust. "The language of the donation plainly indicates a gift of the proceeds of the

bond to the corporation, with directions as to its use, or possibly upon

condition. To hold that the young men and boys referred to are the
beneficiaries in the sense contemplated by our trust statutes and the
cases construing the same would be a very strained construction." Y.
M. C. A. v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 418, 139 N. W. 806.
109. "We hold that, so far as its perpetuity feature is concerned, the
trust here involved, assuming for the moment that its corpus consists
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fortunate doctrine, although it must be confessed that the
result reached in the particular case is to be commended.
What the testator sought to provide for was a trust
for a charitable purpose, and this he could have done in practically every other jurisdiction in the United States;11U and

of course it is well settled that the ordinary doctrines as to
perpetuities do not apply to charitable trusts. It is only
because of the unfortunate restrictions upon the free creation
of charitable trusts in Minnesota that the testator did not
adopt the simple and natural method of giving the property
in question to the Young Men's Christian Association upon a
perpetual trust, to expend the income as it accrued, in providing boys and young men "with education along industrial
lines".
To reach its conclusion that a private trust in perpetuity
is lawful, the court, as the first link in the chain of argumentand seemingly as an essential link,-lays down the doctrine
that prior to the enactment of the amendment of 1875, adding
subdivision five to the list of authorized trusts,"" "a trust in
personalty could not be created in this state (Minnesota) ; all
trusts except those authorized by statute having been
entirely of personalty, is authorized by subdivision 5. It is true, as contended by respondent, that the spirit of our laws is against perpetuities;
but we think, nevertheless, that the legislature did not intend to place
any limitation upon trusts of this kind, any more than upon those authorized by subdivision 7, [municipal charitable trusts] as to which we
have seen that no time limit is deemed to have been imposed. We have
nothing to do with the wisdom of this lack of limit upon duration, and if
it should lead to abuse, the remedy would be with the legislature." Y. M.
C. A. v. Horn (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 414-415, 139 N. W. 806.
The identical question has come up for decision in Michigan and in
Wisconsin. It seems to have been taken for granted in Michigan that
the common law rule against perpetuities continues as to personalty,
Toms v. Williams, (1879) 41 Mich. 552, 562, 2 N. W. 814; while in
Wisconsin an early decision, Dodge v. Williams, (1879) 46 Wis. 70. 92, 1
N. W. 92; held that "the statute limiting the rule against perpetuities to
realty manifestly abrogates the English doctrines as applicable to personality, expressio unius exclusio alterius." Though occasionally questioned,
(e. g. in DeWolf v. Lawson, (1884) 61 Wis. 46Q, 21 N. W. 115, 50 Am. Rep.
148; Webster v. Morris. (1886) 66 Wis. 366, 28 N. W. 353, 57 Am. Rep.
278) this doctrine was finally and decisively upheld in Becker v. Chester,
(1902) 115 Wis. 90, 126-131, 91 N. W. 87, where it was said: "Whether the
decision was right or wrong, to disturb it nou by mere judicial power
would be a far greater mistake than the making thereof, if it were clearly
erroneous. When such a question has been so' long settled as to have
become firmly impressed upon property, the maxim, Stare decisis, et non
quieta niovere, should be regarded as a governing principle in respect
thereto."
110. Perhaps not in Maryland or Virginia. See note 19, supra.
111. Laws 1875 Ch. 53. See note 88, supra.
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abolished by General Statutes 1866, chapter 43, section 1, and
there being then no provisions in our laws authorizing trusts
in personalty."'

2

A contrary view was expressed in Baker v. Terrell,"11
where Emmett, C. J., held that the statutory modification
of the rule creating a presumption of a resulting trust where
one who purchases property takes title in the name of another,
did not apply to such a transaction involving personal property. The opinion in this case opens with the statement that
"there can be but little doubt that the chapter of our statute
concerning uses and trusts

.

.

.

relates to real property

only." This statement was quoted with approval in Shanahan
v. Kelly,14 where the court held that the amendment of 1875,
by listing among the authorized trusts certain private trusts
of personalty, necessarily brought all trusts of personal property, including charitable trusts of personalty, within the
operation of section 1 of the chapter on uses and trusts, which
declares that "uses and trusts, except as authorized and modified in this chapter, are abolished".
As has already been pointed out, the statute of New York,
regulating uses and trusts was practically identical with the
Minnesota statute before the amendments of the latter statute
made in 1875 and subsequent thereto. It has uniformly been
held in New York, that this statute, enumerating trusts of
real estate and making no mention of trusts of personal property, leaves intact the usual rules applicable to trusts of personal property as they existed at the time the statute under
discussion was enacted. 1"'
CONCLUSION.

The foregoing exposition inevitably leads us to the conclusion that Minnesota sorely needs a statute restoring "the ancient charitable use".
To quote from the opinion of Parker, C. J., in Allen v.
112.

(1913) 120 Minn. at p. 411. The General Statutes of 1866, so far as

they applied to trusts, as already noted, were, with one exception, not
here material, the same as the Minnesota Territorial Statutes of 1851, Ch.
60.
113. (1863) 8 Minn. 165 (195).
114. (1903) 88 Minn. 202, 210. 92 N. W. 948.
115. Kane v. Gott. (1840) 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 641. 35 Am. Dec. 641 ; Matter
of Carpenter. (1892) 131 N. Y. 86. 29 N. E. 1005. See also Dodge v.
Williams. (1879) 46 Wis. 70, quoted at page 214, supra.
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Stevens,11 6 in explanation of the New York statute of 1893 reinstating charitable trusts:
"Looking back over the twenty years that had elapsed
since the decision of the court in Holmes v. Mead, the legislature could discover nothing but wrecks of original charities,
charities that were dear to the hearts of their would-be founders, and the execution of which would have been of inestimable value to the public."
So it has been in Minnesota, though perhaps to a less
extent, because in this state the judges have displayed a
greater tendency to strain settled principles of the law in order
to uphold charitable gifts. Nor can they be blamed for so
doing. Of the eleven cases found in our reports involving
dispositions of property for charitable objects, which are
usually cited as authorities upon the matters here under discussion, 117 four were held to be fatally defective, two because they
were attempts to create charitable trusts,"18 and the other two
because the devise upon trust to convey to a corporation about
to be formed either did not provide for a power of sale in the
trustees or did not provide that the conveyance to the corporation should take place within the time limited by the statute
of perpetuities.1" 9 Of the remaining seven decisions, one was
a municipal trust falling within the express provision of subdivision seven of the statute ;120 another has led the Minnesota
supreme court into adopting the obviously unfortunate doctrine that a private trust of personal property may be created
to last in perpetuity; 12 1 and the remaining five are all cases
where to uphold the gift the court treats it as an outright gift
to a charitable corporation already formed, or to be formed,
when it is obvious that the real intent was to make the corporation the legal owner of the property, but to give the
beneficial interest therein, not to the corporation itself, but to
116. (1899) 161 N. Y. 122, 140, 55 N. E. 568.
117. Most of the cases in this summary are cited in 1 Dunnell's Minnesota
Digest Secs. 1419, 1423, and the 1916 Supplement.
118. Little v. Willford. (1883) 31 Minn. 173, 17 N. W. 282, Shanahan v.
Kelly, (1903) 88 Minn. 202, 92 N. W. 948.
119. Rong v. Hailer, (1909) 109 Minn. 191, 123 N. W. 471; Bemis v.
Northwestern Trust Co.. (1912) 117 Minn. 409. 135 N. W. 1124. The
former objection seems to have been overlooked in Atwater v. Russell,
(1892) 49 Minn. 57, 51 N. W. 629, 52 N. W. 26.
120. City of Owatonna v. Rosebrock (1903) 88 Minn. 318, 92 N. W. 1122.
121. Y. M. C. A. v. Horn, (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 139 N. W. 806.
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those individuals who might be the recipients of its bounty.122
In an appendix to this paper, the writer submits a proposed statute to authorize charitable trusts in Minnesota.
EDWARD S. THURSTON.
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA.

APPENDIX.
PROPOSED STATUTE

FOR THE AUTHORIZATION
TRUSTS IN

OF

CHARITABLE

MINNESOTA.*

An act relating to charitable trusts and amending section
3249 of the Revised Laws, 1905, now section 6710 of the General Statutes of Minnesota, 1913, by adding thereto a new
subdivision to be known as subdivision 8.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Minnesota:
Section 1. That section 3249 of the Revised Laws of
Minnesota 1905 (now section 6710 of the General Statutes,
1913) is hereby amended by the addition thereto, as subdivision 8, the following, to-wit:
8. To receive by grant, devise, gift, or bequest and take
charge of, invest, and administer, free from taxation, in accordance with the terms of the trust, any property, real or personal, upon and for any religious, educational, charitable,
benevolent, or public use or trust.
No such trust shall be invalid because of the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the object of such trust or of the persons
designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument
creating the same, nor by reason of the same contravening any
statute or rule against perpetuities or against restraint upon
the free alienation of the legal or equitable estate of real or
personal property.
If in the instrument creating such a grant, devise, gift, or
bequest there is a trustee named to execute the same, the legal
title to the lands or property granted, devised, given, or be122. Atwater v. Russell, (1892) 49 Minn. 57, 51 N. W. 629, 52 N. W. 26.

(See note 121, supra.) In re Tower's Estate, (1892) 49 Minn. 371, 52 N.
W. 27; Lane v. Eaton, (1897), 69 Minn. 141, 71 N. W. 1031, 38 L. R. A.
669, 65 Am. St. Rep. 559; Kahle v. Evangelical Lutheran Joint Synod,
(1900) 81 Minn. 7, 83 N. W. 46; Watkins v. Bigelow, (1904) 93 Minn. 210,
100 N. W. 1104.
* The reader will notice that this proposed statute is, to a great extent,
modeled upon the present statutes of New York and Michigan, which are
printed in notes 47 and 56, supra.
The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor
Henry J. Fletcher of the law faculty of the University of Minnesota for
assistance in the preparation of this proposed statute.
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queathed for such purposes shall vest in such trustee. If no
such trustee shall be named in said instrument, or if a vacancy
occurs in the trusteeship, then the trust shall vest in the district court for the proper county, and shall be executed by
some trustee appointed for that purpose by or under the direction of the court; and said court may make such orders or decrees as may be necessary to vest the title to 'said lands or
property in the trustee so appointed.
The district court for the proper county shall have jurisdiction and visitorial power and control over the grants, devises,
gifts, and bequests in all cases provided for by this act and
over all trusts thereby created. Every such trust shall be
liberally construed by such court so that the intentions of the
creator thereof shall be carried out whenever possible.
And whenever it shall appear to the district court for the
proper county that circumstances have so changed, since the
execution of an instrument containing a grant, devise, gift, or
bequest to any religious, educational, charitable, benevolent,
or public use, as to render impracticable or impossible a literal
compliance with the terms of such instrument, the court may,
upon the application of the trustee or of the person or corporation having the custody of the property, and upon such
notice as the court shall direct, make an order directing that
such grant, devise, gift, or bequest shall be administered or
expended in such manner as in the judgment of the court will
most effectually accomplish the general purpose of the instrument, without regard to and free from any specific restriction,
limitation, or direction contained therein; provided, however,
that no such order shall be made without the consent of the
donor or grantor of the property, if he be living.
The attorney general shall represent the beneficiaries in
all cases arising under this act, and it shall be his duty to enforce such trusts by proper proceedings in the courts.
Section 2. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed, but nothing in this
act contained shall in any manner impair, limit, or abridge the
operation and efficacy of the whole or any part of any statute
authorizing the creation of corporations for charitable purposes, or permitting municipal corporations to act as trustees
for any public or charitable purpose.
Section 3. This act shall take effect and be in force from
and after its passage.

